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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, one of the most striking illustrations of the increased
inequality of income distribution over recent decades is the outsized growth in
CEO compensation in contrast to the compensation of the contemporaneous
1
average working man or women. The ratio of CEO pay to factory worker pay
rose from 42-to-1 in 1960, to a height of 531-to-1 in 2000 at the height of the stock
2
3
market bubble, and it was at 411-to-1 in 2005 and 344-to-1 in 2007.
4
Interestingly; this ratio is about 25-to-1 in Europe.
“[A]fter adjusting for
inflation, CEO pay in 2009 more than doubled the CEO pay average for the decade
of the 1990’s, more than quadrupled the CEO pay average for the 1980’s, and ran
approximately eight times the CEO average for all the decades of the mid-20th
5
century.”
The increase of the CEO versus employee pay gap, along with the subject of
growing income inequality in the United States, has been of concern for some
time, but is an issue in particular during the current prolonged economic slump that
began with the burst of the housing bubble and subsequent financial crisis,
6
especially mortgage derivatives. As the United States endures its worst economic
7
conditions since the Great Depression of the 1930’s, populist rhetoric has
coalesced around the theme of the “99%” versus the “1%”, with the 1% loosely
8
defined as the “richest” citizens of our country. Indeed, there continues to be calls
to action in the form of “Occupy” movements that have no set organization or
agenda, other than self-identified members of the so-called 99% publicly
protesting what they perceive as the injustice around the concentration of income
and wealth into the hands of fewer and fewer individuals, i.e., those that comprise

*Juris Doctor Candidate, 2013, Pepperdine University School of Law; Bachelor of Arts in Business
Economics and Sociology, 2010, University of California, Santa Barbara. I would like to thank my
friends and family for the support they have always provided me.
1
See Sarah Anderson, Chuck Collins, Sam Pizzigati & Kevin Shih, CEO Pay and the Great
Recession: 17th Annual Executive Compensation Survey, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (Sept. 1,
2010), http://www.ips-dc.org/files/2433/EE-2010-web.pdf.dc.org/files/2433/EE-2010-web.pdf, at 4.
2
G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?, http://
www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Anderson et al., supra note 1, at 3.
6
Agustino Fontevecchia, Occupy Wall Street: Income Inequality and the Burden of Action,
FORBES (Nov. 17, 2011, 8:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/11/17/occupywall-street-income-inequality-and-the-burden-of-action/.
7
Anderson et al., supra note 1, at 5.
8
See Tami Luhby, Who are the 1 percent?, CNN MONEY (Oct. 29, 2011, 8:40 AM), http://
money.cnn.com/2011/10/20/news/economy/occupy_wall_street_income/index.htm.
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9

the top 1%. Some of the “Occupy” protesters are socialists and anarchists, who
are genuinely seeking to overthrow capitalism, some are just hangers-on looking to
take advantage of the feel-good circus atmosphere that comes with any large
outdoor gathering, and some are the usual malcontents that will show up at any
10
venue that offers them a way to rebel against social norms.
But what likely
triggers the concern of large numbers of ordinary American citizens, whether they
simply sympathize, or actually show up at a protest event, is the media reports of
the very real compensation packages granted to top corporate executives and to top
11
earners in the financial industry.
Although less than a fifth of the income of the nation’s wealthiest individuals
actually comes from wages and salaries, the symbolism of a CEO making
hundreds of times more than their average employee during a time of massive
12
layoffs, rampant underemployment, and persistent unemployment is undeniable.
Even in other, better economic times this growing discrepancy would violate the
13
average American’s sense of what is fair and unfair.
In this extraordinarily
negative economy, the sense of unfairness is magnified and widespread, and
invites the implementation of yet another wave of solutions aimed at “fixing” the
14
causes of this growing economic injustice.
In the past, a wide variety of political players have sought to confront what
their constituents see as excessive executive bonuses and inappropriately high
incentives, and thus the U.S. government has a history of attempting to use
policies, regulations, and taxes to temper or reverse the CEO versus worker pay
15
gap in real income terms.
Indeed, many combinations have been tried in the
16
17
United States, but as discussed in this paper, so far none have proved effective.
The goal of this paper will be to examine the role of the U.S. Government in

9

Josh Barro, We Are the 99 Percent—Even Rich People, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Oct. 5,
2011, 8:26 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/agenda/279319/we-are-99-percent-even-rich-peoplejosh-barro; see also Joseph Klein, Ninety-Nine Percent Narcissists, FRONTPAGE MAGAZINE (Oct. 7,
2011), http://frontpagemag.com/2011/10/07/ninety-nine-percent-narcissists/.
10
See Ginia Bellafante, Gunning for Wall Street, With Faulty Aim, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/25/nyregion/protesters-are-gunning-for-wall-street-with-faultyaim.html; Drake Bennett, David Graeber, the Anti-Leader of Occupy Wall Street, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (October 26, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/david-graeber-theantileader-of-occupy-wall-street-10262011.html#p1 (noting that a key member of the original Occupy
movement is “an anarchist and radical organizer”); Socialist Party USA: Occupy Wall St.!, SOCIALIST
PARTY USA, http://www.socialistparty-usa.org/occupywallstreet.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013)
(Socialist Party USA supporting the Occupy Wall Street movement).
11
Agustino Fonevecchia, Occupy Wall Street, JPMorgan, and The Fall of The Banks, FORBES
(Oct. 17, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/10/17/jpmorgansdisappointing-earnings-and-occupy-wall-street-have-a-common-cause/.
12
Domhoff, supra note 2.
13
Id.
14
Anderson et al., supra note 1, at 13.
15
Daniel Jurow, Sophie Romana, James Deasy, Walter Haddick, Natalie Napierala & Tiffany
Cale, Executive Compensation: How Does Pay Influence Decisions and Governance?, THE SANFORD
C. BERNSTEIN & CO. CENTER FOR LEADERSHIP AND ETHICS AT COLUMBIA BUSINESS SCHOOL, 7–9,
http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/leadership/about/leb/embapaper (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
16
Id.
17
See discussion infra Part VII.
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the CEO versus worker pay gap, both in contributing to its creation and the ability
to reverse it. To better understand this issue, this paper will include a survey of
current U.S. and foreign CEO compensation practices, a survey of theories
proposed to explain the divergence between U.S. and foreign CEO compensation,
a review of the social and business impact of excessive CEO compensation, and
identify socioeconomic theories regarding the excessive CEO pay trend. This will
be followed by a review of the history of attempted solutions along with newly
enacted and proposed future solutions to further inhibit the growth of excessive
CEO pay, and concluding remarks.
II. CURRENT U.S. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PRACTICES
Generally, the board of directors exists to advise and monitor top
management, protect the interests of the shareholders and, of significance to this
18
paper, establish executive compensation.
“A significant component of a
management control system is the incentive mechanism and motivational
19
underpinning of compensation contracts.”
A properly planned incentive and
compensation system can deal with both adverse-selection and moral hazard
20
issues.
A. The Nature of Cash and Company Stock Compensation Packages
The most popular forms of compensation are cash and company stock. Cash
21
compensation to executives has two main facets: fixed salary and bonus.
Bonuses are generally attributed to a successful implementation of organizational
22
objectives through managerial decisions made by an executive.
“Stock grants
and stock option grants are intended to reward executives for choices that influence
positive changes in the stock prices and as such may be considered a futureoriented reward system, as opposed to bonuses that are typically based on some
23
accounting measure of profitability.”
It has been suggested that accounting
performance measures are used in order to protect executives from being
negatively affected by circumstances that are out of their control, such as
24
marketwide fluctuations in firm value.
Stock prices are clouded by collateral as they are effected by large market–
wide fluctuations, such as ordinary business cycles, as well as monetary and fiscal
decisions and policies, and therefore do not create a direct and absolute correlation

18
Ivan E. Brick, Oded Palmon & John K. Wald, CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and
Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 403, 404 (2006).
19
Mahmoud M. Nourayi & Sudha Krishnan, The Impact of Incentives on CEO Compensation and
Firm Performance, 53 INT’L REV. ECON. 402, 402 (2006).
20
Id.
21
Id. at 403.
22
Id.
23
Id. It has been argued that accounting-based measures are historical measures of performance,
and thus conceptually less relevant from a shareholder’s perspective. Id.
24
Id. at 404–05. (citing another source).
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25

with executive performance. The actual compensation received through stock–
based incentives depends on economic variables and contractual restrictions that
26
affect these stocks and grants.
Various factors, including the volatility of the
27
stock, and fiscal and monetary policies, are beyond the control of the CEO.
Because of this, stock-based compensation carries with it a significant amount of
risk into the agency relationship that exists between the CEO and the company,
28
making compensation less responsive as a measure of performance. Some have
observed a “lower sensitivity of CEO compensation to the rate of return to
29
shareholders as the stock becomes more volatile.”
Nourayi and Krishnan found that while both accounting and market
measures of performance affect the amount realized by a CEO through cash
compensation, market-based analyses saw a more direct correlation with total
30
compensation.
They also found that “CEO compensation contracts with stock
options are more significantly influenced by the market-based performance
measure than by the accounting-based measure”, and concluded ultimately “that
31
firms with market-based returns are less likely to offer market-based incentives.”
B. Indirect Components of CEO Compensation
32

CEO compensation can be both direct and indirect. Direct compensation
includes cash and stock options. Indirect compensation exists in forms other than
33
those paid directly to the executive, among which are tax breaks.
C. Government Response
As discussed in more detail later in this paper, the government has put forth
measures within the last few decades to encourage less excessive executive
34
compensation.
For example, in 1993, Congress capped the deductibility of
CEOs’ salaries at $1 million, unless the extra pay was linked to performance
35
incentives. As a result, boards of directors raised CEOs’ potential income with
increasingly generous stock options, which helped drive executive compensation
off the charts.

25

Id. at 403.
Id. at 406.
27
Id.
28
Id. (citing another source).
29
Id. (citing another source).
30
Id. at 418.
31
Id. at 418–419.
32
David O. Friedrichs, Exorbitant CEO Compensation: Just Reward or Grand Theft?, 51 CRIME,
LAW & SOC. CHANGE 45, 50 (2009).
33
See id.
34
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 162(m), 280G, 4999 (2006).
35
Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government Regulation and the Structure of
Compensation Contracts, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 453–454 (2001).
26
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D. Outcome
While CEOs themselves are not struggling, they are causing others to – by
36
cutting jobs to attribute more wealth to their own already bountiful assets. The
CEOs in 2009 who slashed their payrolls the most “took home 42[%] more
compensation than the year’s chief executive pay average for S&P 500
37
companies.” These excessive rewards gave an enticement and encouragement to
behave irresponsibly and to behave in such a way that would effectively contribute
38
to the financial crisis.
III. COMPENSATION PRACTICES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
As previously noted in this paper’s introduction, the CEO-to-factory-worker
pay ratio in the United States went from 42-to-1 in 1960 to its peak at 531-to-1 in
39
the year 2000. The ratio of CEO pay to factory worker pay then decreased postInternet Bubble, and was at 411-to-1 in 2005 and 344-to-1 in 2007, while during
40
this same time frame in Europe, this ratio was about 25-to-1. This section will
examine the practices, proposals, and trends related to executive compensation
practices that are underway in several other countries.
A. France
France is a country with a very powerful and decentralized administration
41
and regulatory system. In the years leading up to Nicolas Sarkozy’s election as
President, French public opinion was shaken by the reports of very large severance
pay packages given to a number of CEOs who had been forced out of their
42
positions by reason of disastrous corporate results.
Mr. Sarkozy promised to
respond to the outrage, and after being elected President he introduced a bill
43
regarding severance packages that was passed into law on August 21, 2007. The
law called for “clear, publically available performance criteria to be used” in
determining severance pay, and that severance packages account for both
44
individual executive and overall corporate performance.
In the fall of 2008, seeking to further inhibit excessive executive pay, the
French government examined other options, including creating a new government
45
entity and encouraging the adoption of say on pay shareholder rights. These two

36

See generally Anderson, et al., supra note 1.
Id. at 4.
38
Id.
39
Domhoff, supra note 2.
40
Id.
41
Jurow et al., supra note 15, at 11–12.
42
Id. at 11.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. “Say on pay” shareholders rights “shift additional power to shareholders through binding or
advisory votes on compensation issues so that they may effectively prod the board to refine poorly
designed proposals to better represent shareholder interest.” Id. at 9.
37
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ideas were rejected in favor of allowing employers a chance at further reform
46
through self-regulation. The voluntary rules included not allowing executives to
be members of their own company’s board of directors, not issuing severance for
executives who voluntarily leave their company to go work somewhere else or for
those who leave because of poor performance, no granting of stock options without
all employees participating, not discounting stock grants (executives must buy
47
stock at market prices), and capping special annual retirement funds.
Unfortunately, voluntary compliance with these rules was found to be
severely lacking, and this lead to ratification of a new law on executive
48
compensation on March 31, 2009. This new law contains multiple innovative
provisions such as prohibiting the granting of stock options or discounted stock to
the executives and board members of any company that has received bailout
49
monies from the French government. The law also includes the provision that if
a company is involved in massive layoffs of employees, any variable compensation
50
plan for corporate executives is automatically suspended. Additionally, the law
includes the requirement that forces the exclusion of CEOs from board
membership, as well as prohibits board chairmen from employment at the same
51
company where they sit on the board.
Moreover, severance pay can only be
given upon forced termination, provided the company is not in financial trouble,
52
and may not exceed two years in duration.
B. Netherlands
The New Dutch Corporate Governance Code (the “Code”) went into effect
53
on January 1, 2009.
The Code strictly defines the acceptable structure of
executive management compensation schemes, which can include a fixed and
variable component, with the variable component consisting of predetermined,
54
predominately long-term targets. In any case, it is mandated that management
remuneration schemes cannot encourage executives to act in their sole best
55
interests.
The remuneration schemes must also be analyzed against scenarios
that examine the extent of the risks that the variable portion of a remuneration
scheme may expose the company, and a report of this risk analysis must be made
56
public through the company’s web site.
Implicit in this requirement is the
acknowledgment that certain executive compensation practice can pose a threat to

46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
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57

the integrity of a firm.
C. Japan

Japan differs from other countries in that seniority, not performance, is the
58
most important factor determining executive compensation. Another difference
is that within the Japanese culture, large executive compensation packages are held
59
to be “socially offensive.”
These two cultural factors have resulted in a stark
difference between the average pay of Japanese CEOs and that of their Western
60
counterparts.
It has also resulted in a low multiple, about 30 to 40 times,
61
between average CEO pay and the minimum wage.
These two cultural factors have another interesting effect. Japanese CEO
pay, since it is based on seniority, does not change whether a company has a good
62
There is little or nothing in Japanese CEO pay related to
year or a bad year.
63
annual or long-term incentives. Both the good and bad of this is that there is
64
little incentive for risk-taking. It has been recently observed that the Japanese
national culture is slowly changing, and reward for individual excellence is
65
increasing.
D. Germany
Germany is transitioning to the view that businesses must go beyond being
66
merely profit-oriented, to being “responsible citizens” within their society.
Consistent with this idea, along with Austria, Germany is considering
incorporating environmental, social, and governance metrics alongside the
expected executive compensation components of individual and firm
67
performance. If this level of social accountability becomes a mandated part of
every CEO pay package in Germany, it will force a level of transparency that
makes explicit the social compact that many likely feel should be at least implicit
in other capitalistic systems, including the United States.
IV. THEORIES EXPLAINING DIFFERENCE IN U.S. VERSUS FOREIGN CEO PAY
In Asia, executive compensation is “far more modest than what it is in the

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 13.
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United States”; exemplifying this is the average compensation of Japanese
69
corporate presidents coming in at under $500,000.
Even the Western world
counterpart, Britain, had much more socially acceptable and modest executive pay
70
packages than its American counterparts.
“Yet there is no particular evidence
that American corporations during this period have been more effectively managed
or led than their Asian or British counterparts, or that American CEOs are more
71
talented and harder working.” If it were possible to subtract out the unintended
consequences of U.S. government actions that actually had the perverse effect of
increasing CEO pay rather than dampening its rate of increase relative to the
average worker, are there still understandable and socially acceptable reasons why
American CEOs would earn more on average than their foreign counterparts?
There are multiple theories that possibly explain why foreign CEOs have not
experienced the same rapid increase in pay as seen in the United States,
independent of deleterious government actions and interference. This section will
briefly summarize five of them. Explaining
A. Marginal Revenue Product Theory
Marginal Revenue Product is the amount that a factor of production,
72
including management labor, contributes to the value of a firm.
In a wellfunctioning competitive labor market, the negotiations between an informed buyer
(i.e. the Board of Directors), and an informed seller (i.e. the CEO), should result in
73
the CEO being paid their marginal revenue product.
This is because the
company will hire “labor up to the point that . . . the wage rate, [which represents
the cost of an additional worker], equals the additional revenue” contribution of
74
that worker.
Thus, the position of CEO would be more highly compensated,
75
based on the extent of the potential and real higher contribution to the firm.
Good individual managers can have significant impact on the growth in a
firm’s value, and firms with higher growth potential can therefore afford to
discriminate and pay what it takes to attract and retain management with the skills
76
to realize that potential. Correspondingly, CEOs who can handle more complex
77
tasks and more complex organizations are more talented and thus better paid.
The same is true of CEOs who have both the skills and opportunity to operate
within economic systems that permit them to exercise more organizational

68

Friedrichs, supra note 32, at 52.
Id. (based on figures for the year 2005).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market
Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1176 (2004).
73
Id. at 1200.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1201.
77
Id. at 1202.
69
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78

power.
Therefore, a straightforward explanation of the tendency of foreign
CEOs to be paid less than American CEOs may be found in some combination of
comparative circumstances where foreign CEOs have less growth opportunity,
79
smaller and less complex organizations, or weaker corporate powers.
B. Tournament Theory
The Tournament Theory holds that each round of management advancement
80
is a competition characterized by what are essentially single-elimination rounds.
Thus, high senior executive pay is the prize money given to the ultimate winner of
81
the contests that make up each firm’s internal labor market.
Big tournaments
tend to award big prize money, and the CEOs of U.S. firms tend to have much
more power than the CEOs of foreign firms, so American CEO jobs are
comparatively the bigger tournaments and the American CEO pay the bigger
82
prizes.
The disparity in U.S. versus foreign CEO pay is further amplified by
83
acceptance of the “winner-take-all” attitude in American culture.
This theory
also explains internal corporate pay differences such as the often large difference
84
in middle management pay and CEO pay within U.S. firms.
C. Opportunity Cost Theory
The Opportunity Cost Theory asserts that CEO pay is largely determined by
85
the amount they would be paid in their next best alternative job opportunity. In
order to attract and retain CEO talent, a firm must pay at least an amount equal to
86
an individual’s specific opportunity costs.
Applying this theory, the rise in American CEO pay starting in the 1980s can
be explained by the opening up of financial markets, which in turn gave American
87
CEOs many more employment alternatives. In contrast, foreign markets tended
to be more fragmented and regulated, have less capital available for starting new
business ventures, which left foreign CEOs historically with fewer employment
88
options. Thus, relatively lower opportunity cost drives relatively lower pay for
foreign CEOs.

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id. at 1203–09.
Id. at 1209–10.
Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1176–77.
Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1177.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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D. Bargaining Power Theory
The Bargaining Power Theory accounts for the shift in power in the mid1980s that increased the relative bargaining power of American CEOs in takeover
89
bids.
As a result of court decisions, legal entitlement to approve hostile
takeovers shifted from a firm’s shareholders to its management and board of
90
directors. Specifically, in Moran v. Household International, Inc., the Delaware
Supreme Court, for the first time, upheld the ability to block hostile takeovers
91
through Shareholder Rights Plans.
The United States Supreme Court further
92
added to management’s powers by upholding stringent state anti-takeover laws.
At about the same time there was a push for pay-for-performance by big
institutional investors that caused a dramatic increase in the use of stock options
93
and restricted stock in CEO pay packages.
All of the changes in the mid-1980s that dramatically increased the
bargaining power of American CEOs, in turn, caused U.S. CEO pay packages to
dramatically increase relative to the pay packages of foreign CEOs, who saw no
94
corresponding increase in their bargaining power. American CEOs subsequently
had the power to negotiate large pay and severance packages, and agreements with
terms that favored them in exchange for a relinquishment of their block of a hostile
95
acquisition of their firm.
E. Risk Adjustment Theory
The Risk Adjustment Theory recognizes that American CEOs, unlike foreign
96
CEOs, tend to receive much of their pay in stock options. As a result, American
97
CEOs likely have much of their personal wealth in company stock.
This
unbalanced personal financial portfolio constitutes a relatively large risk, and thus
98
American CEOs seek to be compensated for the size of this risk.
In turn,
companies are forced to pay CEOs more to get them to take the risk of narrowly
99
concentrating their wealth in a single financial instrument.
Foreign CEOs face much less pressure to hold company stock and there is
usually no incentive for foreign companies to use stock options instead of cash
100
Without the concentration of wealth caused by the
when it comes to bonus pay.

89

Id. at 1241.
Id.
91
See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985).
92
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of
second generation of state antitakeover statutes).
93
Thomas, supra note 72, at 1241.
94
See Domhoff, supra note 2.
95
See Thomas, supra note 72, at 1244.
96
Id. at 1179.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 1179–80. Many foreign CEOs work in countries with debt-based systems (versus the
equity-based system of the United States) where the creditors “care about minimizing the agency costs
90
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extensive use of stock options as a form of executive pay, there is less firm101
specific risk to be compensated for.
V. THE SOCIAL AND BUSINESS IMPACT
Since every government action impacting an aspect of the American
economic system has associated direct and indirect costs and risks, a fundamental
question is whether the distortions resulting from the current CEO compensation
practices are fair or harmful to society as a whole, i.e., is there a compelling,
rational, justifiable need to act. Perhaps the real issue of CEO pay is more the
results of powerful symbolism, with concern resulting from the (artificially
elevated?) sensationalism surrounding the big income numbers of a few outliers
that are occasionally reported in the news media, that is then picked up and used by
special interest groups to fit their own propaganda scripts. Is this a case of envy
magnified by the combination of the current economic downturn and the very
connected world of social media, instant communications, and around-the-clock
news outlets? In such a case, rather than a direct economic link to harming other
members of society, maybe the real harm could be the impact of the sensationalism
itself, as it serves to undermine confidence in the legal, corporate, and political
institutions that are woven together to create the economic engine of the United
States. While such a new-found lack of faith in the American system of capitalism
does seem to be a major theme repeatedly reported on in the current prolonged
economic downturn, some hold that movements such as “Occupy Wall Street” are
102
simply “a natural reaction to a downturn in the [economic] cycle.”
If that is the
case, short of the remotely slim chance of provoking a revolution, possibly the
worst harm would be contributing enough to negative consumer sentiment to
somewhat delay the economy’s recovery. Thus, pursuing government remedies
and countermeasure for current CEO pay practices would then be waste of time
and taxpayer monies.
On the other hand, perhaps there is a direct economic link to harming other
members of society because of distortions resulting from the current CEO
compensation practices. Conceivably, it is possible that CEO compensation
practices are more than bad optics for the social media to rant about and are
actually causing distortions in the economy that are harming large segments of
American society or even the American economy’s health, growth, and
competiveness as a whole. And perhaps the harm created is both direct, such as
decisions that hurt the results and potential of individual corporations, and indirect,
such as giving permission to other actors in the economic arena, like members of
financial institutions, to equally pursue outrageous, excessive, unjustified, and

of debt.” Id. at 1254. The creditors don’t want to align the interests and incentives of the managers
with those of the shareholders, because this would increase the agency costs of debt. Id. “Furthermore,
most of these countries’ firms have control shareholders already monitoring managers to insure that
they do what is in (the controlling) shareholders’ best interests, so additional alignment is
unnecessary.” Id.
101
Id. at 1180.
102
Fonevecchia, supra note 11.
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even corrupt compensation practices. It may be that the real ultimate harm of bad
CEO compensation practices is that it drives, across the entire economy, CEO
behavior and decisions that result in producing suboptimal long-term performance
in American corporations. This, in turn, is causing a transfer of American wealth,
power, prestige, and political strength to other nations less prone to American-style
corporate executive compensation practices. If indeed this is the situation, with
potentially dire geopolitical consequences for the American public, the appropriate
follow-on is to discover whether current and past attempts in government
sponsored remedies and countermeasures are a cure or a cause of problematic CEO
compensation practices.
Therefore, it is important that the question of whether the distortions
resulting from the current CEO compensation practices are fair or harmful to
society as a whole be considered in the context of the bigger issue of the
concentration of wealth and power in American society and its potential
consequences. In other words, does the envy of highly paid executives have
enough underlying substance accompanying it to justify anger and action, or is
perception distinct from reality in this case?
A. Wealth Distribution
In the United States, wealth is highly concentrated in a relatively few hands.
As of 2010, the top 1% of households (the upper class) owned 35.4% of all
privately held wealth, and the next 19% (the managerial, professional, and small
business stratum) had 53.5%, which means that just 20% of the people owned a
remarkable 89%, leaving only 11% of the wealth for the bottom 80% (wage and
103
salary workers).

Between 1983 and 2004, the top 1% of American saw their net worth grow
$6 million on average, a 78% inflation adjusted increase, while the bottom 40%
experienced a drop of 59% in their average net worth, and the middle class
104
experienced a remarkable increase in debt.
B. Income Distribution
“As of 2007, income inequality in the United States was at an all-time high
for the past 95 years, with the top 0.01% . . . receiving 6% of all U.S. wages,
double what it was . . . in 2000; the top 10% received 49.7%, the highest since
105
1917.”
From 1949 to 1979, “the income of the bottom 80% of wage earners
106
rose at a higher rate than that of the top 1%” of wage earners.
Since 1979, and
107
especially more recently, this has changed considerably.
“Between 1966 and
2001, median wage salary income increased by just 11%, after inflation[, whereas,]

103
104
105
106
107

Domhoff, supra note 2.
Friedrichs, supra note 32, at 49.
Domhoff, supra note 2 (citation omitted).
Friedrichs, supra note 32, at 49.
Id.
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[a]t the 99th percentile . . . the rise was 121%.”
These numbers alone should be
a major cause for concern and a probing analysis. But further, at the 99.99th
109
percentile, the rise was 617%.
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data released in
2007 shows that the top 3 million Americans represented income equivalent to that
110
of the bottom 150 million Americans combined in 2005.
Compared with the
current gap between the top and bottom of the income ladder, inequality of this
111
magnitude has not existed since prior to the stock market crash of the 1920’s.
C. Examples of Harm
A research paper entitled “When Executives Rake in Millions: Meanness in
112
Organizations” was published in 2010.
The authors looked for correlations
113
between executive compensation and how employees are treated.
Their key
finding: the larger the disparity between executive pay and that of the typical
114
employee, the more likely employees are to be mistreated.
The hypothesis: the
115
larger the pay gap, the more likely executives are to be arrogant and dictatorial.
Beyond the harm to a firm caused by the damaging behavior driven by
distorted risk-taking incentives built into current CEO compensation practices,
there are multiple associated forms of social harm that arise. First, if CEO
compensation is excessive, then the unwarranted or unnecessary portion of that
compensation takes away returns, wages, or benefits that could, or should, go to
116
others such as employees and shareholders.
Secondly, given the potent
symbolism of perceived excess in CEO compensation, it can damage the social
117
fabric by generating widely diffused distrust, resentment, and anger.
Finally,
excessive CEO pay can ultimately create a “poisoning” effect that could jeopardize
118
continuation of the political-economic structure our system exists within.

108
109

Id.
Id. This percentile “represent[s] the 13,000 highest-paid workers in the American economy.”

Id.
110

Id.
Id. at 51 (citing Paul Krugman, An Unjustified Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/opinion/13krugman.html). “For some commentators, then, the recent
pattern justifies calling the current era a ‘New Gilded Age,’ returning us to the type of blatant social
inequality characterizing the United States more than a century ago.” Friedrichs, supra note 32, at 51.
112
SREEDHARI D. DESAI, DONALD PALMER, JENNIFER M. GEORGE & ARTHUR P. BRIEF, WHEN
EXECUTIVES RAKE IN MILLIONS: THE CALLOUS TREATMENT OF LOWER LEVEL EMPLOYEES (2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612486.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Friedrichs, supra note 32, at 58.
117
Id.
118
Id.
111
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VI. PROPOSED THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
A. The Agency Problem
The board of directors of a corporation may be ineffective in acting as a
proper check on executive performance and behavior “because board culture
inhibits constructive criticism, and because of informational asymmetry problems
119
that exist between management and the board.”
The board is compensated by
the company, and coupled with excessive compensation to the board may further
120
encourage a lack of criticism.
Expanding on this, the lack of control of the rapid
increase in executive pay can be viewed as an agency problem between
shareholders and management, because public companies have dispersed
ownership that cannot be expected to effectively bargain at arm’s length with
121
management.
As a result, managers exercise extensive influence over their own
compensation. “Any discussion of executive compensation must proceed against
the background of the fundamental agency problem afflicting management
122
decision-making.”
There are two prevailing views on how the executive
compensation and agency problems may be linked: the “optimal contracting
123
approach” and the “managerial power approach.”
B. Optimal Contracting Approach
The financial economists’ dominant approach to the study of executive
compensation—the “optimal contracting approach”—views these pay
124
arrangements as a partial remedy to the agency problem.
The board attempts to
125
use the compensation packages to cost-effectively incentivize the managers.
Under this model, the main flaw with the existing practice of executive
compensation seems to be that compensation schemes are not sufficiently high
powered “due to political limitations on how generously executives can be
126
treated.”
“Optimal compensation contracts could result either from effective
arm’s length bargaining between the board and the executives, or from market
constraints that induce these parties to adopt such contracts even in the absence of
127
arm’s length bargaining.”
A large problem arises when one sees the favoritism
among the board-CEO relationship. “Directors will generally wish to be re-

119

Brick et al., supra note 18, at 404.
Id. Compensation for each Enron director is reported to have been $380,619 for the year 2001.
Id. “Most observers agree that the high compensation of Enron’s directors may have compromised
their objectivity in monitoring management on behalf of shareholders.” Id.
121
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9813, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w9813.
122
Id. at 1.
123
Id. at 1–2.
124
Id. at 1.
125
Id. at 2–3.
126
Id. at 1–2.
127
Id. at 3.
120
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appointed to the board[,]” which, “[b]esides an attractive salary . . . provide[s]
128
prestige and valuable business and social connections.”
CEOs play an integral
role in choosing boards, which provides most directors with an “incentive to favor
129
the CEO.”
C. Managerial Power Approach
Another approach, termed the “managerial power approach,” views
executive compensation “not only as a potential instrument for addressing agency
130
problems[,] but also as part of the agency problem itself.”
Because executives
seem to have substantial influence over their own pay, as this increases, so does
131
their ability to extract greater rents.
A major component of the managerial
132
power approach is “‘outrage’ costs and constraints.”
This constraint is based
around how much outrage a proposed compensation package is expected to cause
with shareholders and relevant outsiders—the more outrage that is expected, the
less likely directors will be to approve the arrangement in order to avoid
embarrassment or reputational harm, and reduce shareholders’ support for the
133
incumbent board in proxy contests and takeover bids.
There is evidence that
134
suggests pay arrangements are indeed influenced by outsider perception.
This
“outrage” pillar of the managerial power approach leads into the next—the
“camouflage,” which is the means by which managers try to “obscure” or
“legitimize” (“camouflage”) their extraction of rents to avoid the previously
135
discussed “outrage.”
This helps explain many otherwise unexplainable
136
occurrences in executive compensation practices.
Four patterns and practices can be somewhat attributed by power and
camouflage: “the relationship between power and pay; the use of compensation
consultants; executive loans; and golden good-bye payments to departing
137
executives.”

128

Id.
Id.
130
Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
131
Id. at 5. Managerial rent seeking is when the pay arrangements are structured so that the
payments are in excess of the manager’s opportunity costs. Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1301
(1995), available at http://works.bepress.com/aaron_edlin/6.
132
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 121, at 5.
133
Id.
134
Id. Studies have shown that:
CEO’s of firms receiving negative media coverage of their compensation
arrangements during 1992-94 received relatively small pay increases during
subsequent years and had their compensation’s pay-performance sensitivity
increased. [Additionally], during the 1990’s, CEO’s of firms that were the target
of shareholder resolutions criticizing executive pay had their annual
compensation reduced over the following two years by $2.7 million.
Id.
135
Id. at 6.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 7 (these golden good-bye payments are commonly known as “golden parachutes”).
129
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A power-pay relationship that is advantageous for a CEO can result from a
138
weak board or a lack of a large outside shareholder.
Likewise, the presence of a
large outside shareholder is likely to result in closer monitoring and thus is
139
expected to reduce a CEO’s influence over his own compensation.
Also, a large
concentration of institutional shareholders might result in greater monitoring and
140
scrutiny of the CEO and the board.
A trend has shown that a more concentrated
institutional ownership leads to lower executive compensation and more
141
performance-sensitive compensation.
U.S. public companies often employ what are known as compensation
consultants to aid in structuring pay packages, which also can result in furthering
142
the camouflaging of rents.
Providing advice that negatively affects the CEO or
other executives would only hinder the consultant’s chances of future employment
with the current firm or another firm, which provides a perverse incentive for them
143
to apply their expertise in a way that helps increase the compensation packages.
They can provide types of compensation data that are most favorable to
144
accomplish their analyses and recommendation to that end.
145
“pension plans, deferred compensation, and postExecutive loans,
retirement perks” are among the practices used to make the total compensation
146
package less transparent.
Along with being less transparent, these practices all
147
make the executive pay less salient as well.
Finally, golden parachutes are the practice of the board giving a departing
CEO payments and benefits that are gratuitous—not required under the terms of
148
the CEO’s compensation contract.”
These can occur when the CEO’s
149
performance has warranted his or her replacement.
It is hard to reconcile such

138

Id.
Id. “[A] “negative relationship [has been observed] between the equity ownership of the largest
shareholder and the amount of CEO compensation; doubling the percentage ownership of the outside
shareholder reduces non-salary compensation by 12– to 14%.” percent.” Id. at 7–8.
140
Id. at 8.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 9.
143
Id.
144
Id. Bebchuk & Fried provide the following examples:
[W]hen firms do well, consultants recommend increasing compensation, arguing
that pay should reflect performance and should be higher than the average in the
industry—and certainly higher than that of CEO’s who are doing poorly. In
contrast, when firms do poorly, the consultants focus not on performance data but
rather on peer group pay to argue that CEO compensation should be higher to
reflect prevailing industry levels.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
145
While executive loans are now illegal under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, “prior to the Act’s
adoption more than 75[%] of the 1,500 largest U.S. firms lent money to executives.” Id. at 10.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 11–12.
149
Id. at 12. An example of such golden parachutes:
[W]hen Mattel CEO Jill Barad resigned under fire, the board forgave a $4.2
million loan, gave her an additional $3.3 million in cash to cover the taxes for
139
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gratuitous golden parachute payments with the efficient optimization that would or
150
should occur as a result from an arm’s length, optimal contracting approach.
However, a golden parachute pay package may be necessary to discard a CEO
whom many directors are loyal to in order to assemble a board majority in favor of
151
replacing him.
These payments result from the CEO’s relationship with, and
152
influence over, the board.
D. Extravagant Compensation as a Criminological Phenomenon
There is a compelling argument that extravagant CEO compensation is
appropriately regarded as a criminological phenomenon, and thus it is a societal
153
failure not to treat it as a crime.
While criminal behavior can often be associated
154
with social harm, they are not synonymous.
This can be exemplified by having
instances of criminal behavior that have no social harm and some perfectly legal
actions that can cause great social harm—although later, many of these can
155
become illegal, such as monopolistic practices.
Friedrichs claims “that
exorbitant CEO compensation should be recognized as a form of white-collar
156
crime” in the same vein that other business practices have since become illegal.
Framing the exorbitant CEO compensation issue in criminological terms allows for
a richer understanding of both the parallels and possible differences between such
phenomena that occur in the most privileged circles within society and those forms
of harm occurring principally in the most underprivileged circles that are
157
conventionally—and without much controversy—regarded as crime.

Friedrichs explains a basic typology of views on such CEO compensation
that can be introduced within three classifications: earned, excessive, and
158
extortionate.
The earned perspective takes the view that, however excessive
CEO compensation may seem to be, it is fully merited for their hard work and
159
unique talents.
“CEOs . . . are . . . entitled to whatever extravagant
160
compensation is awarded to them.”
In the excessive view, extravagant CEO pay

forgiveness of another loan, and allowed her unvested options to automatically
vest and remain exercisable until the end of their original terms. These gratuitous
benefits were in addition to the considerable benefits that she received under her
employment agreement, which included a termination payment of $26.4 million
and a stream of retirement benefits exceeding $700,000 per year.
Id.
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Friedrichs, supra note 32, at 46–47.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id.
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is excessive; CEOs are entitled to be paid well, but certain levels that are
161
extravagant are too excessive.
While the first two classifications are all but mundane in comparison, the
third introduces a more controversial, albeit not novel, approach. The extortionate
“view regards excessive CEO compensation as a function of inherently corrupt
dimensions of the present structure of corporate governance, rife with multiple
conflicts of interest allowing for out-of-control self-dealing, and wholly
unwarranted relative to the contribution to corporate profitability made by
162
CEOs.”
When excessive pay accompanies poor performance of the firm, it
163
becomes especially egregious.
Through this outlook, legal reform is the
appropriate response, although whether it should be regarded as a civil and
164
regulatory issue versus a criminal issue is another layer of argument.
One of the
themes that Friedrichs explores is that the lines between instances of obvious
criminal conduct and those of “exorbitant CEO compensation” can be quite
165
ambiguous.
A recent case in Germany in 2006 could be an indicator of the direction the
166
Criminal charges were brought against directors of a mobile
issue could head.
167
phone company for having awarded the CEO a bonus of $31 million.
While the
case was resolved with a settlement, it can establish a standard for the
168
criminalization of excessive and egregious compensation packages.

E. Cronyism
A 2006 study investigated whether overcompensation of directors and CEOs
169
is related to firm underperformance.
CEO and director compensation was
modeled “using a variety of firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and
170
governance variables.”
The study found “that director compensation is closely
related to the monitoring and effort required of directors to ensure value
171
maximization.”
However, the study also found “a highly significant positive
172
relation between CEO and director compensation.”
There is also a positive
relation (0.472) between the annual director fee and the CEO total
173
compensation.
They hypothesized that “this relation could be due to unobserved

161
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164
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166
167
168
169
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171
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173

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 51–52.
Id. at 52.
See Brick et al., supra note 18, at 403.
Id. at 421.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 409 tbl.3.
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firm complexity (omitted variables) or to excessive compensations of directors and
managers associated with an environment of ineffective monitoring, which is
174
termed cronyism in the popular press.”
Upon testing these, the evidence
suggested and supported the hypothesis that the relationship between CEO and
director compensation was symptomatic of cronyism where the relationship
175
between firm performance and excess compensation was negative.
VII. ATTEMPTED U.S. SOLUTIONS AND THEIR RESULTS
Government regulation of executive pay has historically been not only
incomplete and ineffective, but has also had perverse and unintended
176
consequences.
The topics of what is fair compensation for executives and how
to best tie executive compensation to long-term creation of shareholder value are
177
not exactly recent points of contention.
In fact, from its creation, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has tried to determine whether the
value a company created was being appropriately shared with employee and
shareholders, or if it was inappropriately being hoarded or otherwise benefiting
178
management.
A. SEC Rule Requiring Simple-To-Understand Table for Executive
Compensation
Inevitably, when federal policymakers attempted to intercede, usually in
response to considerable pressure from the public, and regulate compensation
practices, they “succeeded only in moving executive pay from one pocket to
179
another.”
The first example of this is the change the SEC made in 1942 that
180
required “simple-to-understand” tables disclosing executive compensation.
Prior to this, firms would describe compensation in narrative form, so the change
in SEC rules was indeed an improvement in clarity and better allowed a
181
comparison between firms and from year-to-year.
However, the forms in effect
limited the types of compensation that had to be reported, and thus invited the
dramatic increase in use of a wide variety of compensation “hidden payment
182
vehicles” that did not need to be reported.
This persisted up until 1978, when
the SEC issued new rules requiring the inclusive reporting “of all compensation
183
types.”
This change in 1978 resulted in executive compensation shifting back
towards salary since there were no gains to be had by using hidden payment

174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
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Id. at 421.
Id.
Jurow et al., supra note 15, at 1.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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184

vehicles or extravagant perks.

B. Limiting the Tax Deductibility of Certain Executive Compensation
Another example of a federal attempt to regulate compensation practices that
only succeeded in moving executive pay from one pocket to another, with “the
185
186
cure being worse than the disease,” is I.R.C. § 162(m), which was signed in
187
1993.
In 1993, President Clinton proposed and Congress adopted I.R.C. §
162(m), “that disallows deductions for nonperformance related compensation over
one million dollars for the CEO” as well as the other four highest compensated
188
officers of the corporation.
This provision does not apply to compensation “on a
commission basis, compensation that is performance-based, and compensation
189
under a binding written contract in effect on February 13, 1993.”
“Although the objective of Congress in enacting 162(m) was to reduce
excessive compensation, shareholder activists were mostly concerned with
190
For example, the House
enhancing relation between pay and performance.”
Ways and Means Committee stated the following intent of the provision:
Recently, the amount of compensation received by corporate executives has
been the subject of scrutiny and criticism. The committee believes that excessive
compensation will be reduced if the deduction for compensation (other than
performance-based compensation) paid to the top executives of publicly held
191
corporations is limited to $1 million per year.
To further support Congress’s intention of 162(m) being a measure to shape
corporation behavior rather than raise substantial revenue, a “survey reports that
87% of the firms surveyed intended to implement [the required] changes for
positive shareholder relations while only 43% [ ] mentioned [ ] [tax]
192
considerations . . .
While the firms were conscious of conforming to 162(m), it
wasn’t necessarily evidenced by a reduction in a total executive compensationbonus and long-term incentive plans and grants of restricted stock “nearly doubled
193
from 1992 to 1997” following the implementation of 162(m).
This new law called “any [corporate executive] pay above $1 million that
[was not] tied to performance ‘excessive’” and thus made that portion of executive
194
This had multiple
pay above $1 million not deductible from corporate income.
perverse effects. One unintended effect was that it “legitimized” this $1 million
amount as the baseline for executive pay, and thus over time, this had the net

184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

Id. at 8.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2006).
Jurow et al., supra note 15, at 8.
Perry & Zenner, supra note 35, at 458; 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(3)(B) (2006).
Perry & Zenner, supra note 35, at 458.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 455 (citing 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 877).
Perry & Zenner, supra note 35, at 459.
Id. at 460.
Jurow et al., supra note 15, at 8.
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impact of increasing, or ratcheting up, the average CEO pay.
Additionally,
because the stated purpose of the law was to tie CEO compensation to corporate
performance, after 1993 there was a major shift and large increase to the use of
employee stock option grants, which created an almost reckless obsession with
short-term earnings and directly lead to the inevitable accompanying accounting
196
scandals.
C. Other Examples of Using the Tax Code to Limit Executive Compensation
There are many examples to illustrate that the use of tax code to restrict what
concerned politicians saw as excessive executive compensation has been
notoriously ineffective. Both of the following examples once again illustrate a
“ratchet effect” on CEO compensation, where the unintended consequence was to
actually raise average compensation by increasing acceptable minimums for
197
certain compensation practices. For instance, in 1984, IRC § 280G “disallowed
tax deductions for golden parachutes in excess of 2.99 times [an executive’s]
198
annual compensation . . . .”
Naturally, as section 162(m) had standardized a $1
million CEO salary, section 280G effectively made a golden parachute at 2.99
199
times annual compensation the legitimized standard.
In 1989, IRC § 4999 was
200
adopted,
which required executives to pay a 20% excise tax on golden
201
parachutes above the 2.99 times annual compensation limit.
The reaction of
compensation committees to this was additional payments to executives to cover
the new mandatory 20% excise tax, plus cover the extra tax created by this
202
additional payment itself.
Thus section 4999 resulted in not only an additional
transfer of shareholder value to a departed executive, additional shareholder value
203
was also being transferred to the federal government.
It is a straightforward
conclusion that these types of efforts to “cap[] on compensation through the tax
code do not work because they are specific and proscriptive, and therefore easily
204
circumvented or abused by compensation committees.”
D. Comprehensive Disclosure of Executive Compensation
205

Since the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC has focused on disclosure rules,
and in fact, “today the United States has the most comprehensive disclosure rules
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I.R.C. § 280G (2006).
Jurow et al., supra note 15, at 8.
Id.
I.R.C. § 4999 (2006).
Jurow et al., supra note 15, at 8.
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206

of any country.”
The SEC changes to disclosure rules in 1942 and 1978 have
207
already been discussed above.
The basic assumption driving the SEC to ever
more transparent disclosure of corporate executive compensation policies and
practices is that it will “shame” boards of directors into doing the right thing for
208
their shareholders and employees.
The increased public attention on the pay for performance relation resulted in
209
These additional disclosure
regulatory intervention by the SEC in 1993.
requirements included “enhanced disclosure on executive compensation and the
enactment of tax legislation limiting the deductibility of nonperformance related
210
compensation over one million dollars. . . .”
The goal of these requirements was
to make disclosure of executive compensation paid “clearer and more concise” and
211
more useful to shareholders.
Some of the main features of the new rules were that companies: 1) compare
financial performance to an industry benchmark with graphs and tables; 2) disclose
the annual and long-term compensation for the CEO and four most highly paid
executives; 3) estimate the present value of managerial stock options; and 4)
provide a report by the compensation committee identifying measures used to
212
evaluate executives.
Interestingly, research has shown that upon examination,
“managers choose industry- and peer-company stock return benchmarks that are
213
downward biased”, which in turn overstate the firm’s performance.
In 2006, the SEC created the “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” filing
which requires companies “to disclose all prior and potential payments [to
executives], of any form or function[,]” including “perks, severance, and
214
retirement packages, as well as payout ranges for incentive plans. . . .”
All of
this focus, decade after decade, on increased transparency of executive
compensation, has been ineffective, as CEO pay has actually increased as
215
disclosure requirements increased.
Even with increasing SEC disclosure
requirements, compensation committees and compensation experts seek loopholes,
216
as well as more “opaque” methods of compensation.
Plus, disclosure of
compensation packages can actually lead to the ratchet effect as other executives
and their supportive compensation committees seek to not fall behind other

206

Jurow et al., supra note 15, at 8.
See discussion supra Part VII.A.
208
Jurow et al., supra note 15, at 8.
209
New SEC rules on executive compensation disclosure were proposed in July 1992, became
effective in October 1992, and were revised in August 1993 after an extensive review by the SEC of
about 1,000 proxy statements. Securities and Exchange Commission, Release Nos. 33-6962; 33-6966;
33-7009; and 34-32723.
210
Perry & Zenner, supra note 35, at 453.
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Id. at 455.
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Id. at 457.
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Id. at 458.
214
Jurow et al., supra note 15, at 8.
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VIII. NEW AND PROPOSED EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION SOLUTIONS
A. Use of Progressive Tax System to Redistribute Income
Do taxes really redistribute income? In spite of the progressive structure of
federal income tax in the United States, the answer to this question, according to
218
multiple studies, appears to be “no.”
While using government sources can
“show a little bit of progressivity,” the effective tax rates do not really accomplish
any real redistribution of income as a result of attempts to tax the rich to transfer
219
income (and thus redistribute their wealth) to other members of society.
There
are multiple reasons for this. First, the effective tax rate for income earners is
different from the official tax rates because all types of taxes across all
governmental levels must be considered, including not just federal income taxes,
220
but also state taxes, local taxes, payroll taxes, and sales taxes, among others.
Additionally, the wealthy tend to earn much more of their income from sources
other than wages and salaries, such as investments that are either tax-free or taxed
at capital gains rates, which also reduce the intended impact of the sharply
221
progressive federal tax rates for ordinary income.
Although the top income
earners do indeed pay the majority of income taxes, this is likely a result of the
extreme concentration of income in the top percentile, and has done nothing to
reverse the increase in income inequality or the concentration of wealth into the
222
hands of fewer individuals and families.
There is no reason to believe the
American political system will suddenly allow or tolerate the use of the income tax
system for the effective outright seizure of excessive CEO income. While it may
appeal to some to further increase the federal income tax rates on higher income
earners to extreme levels, historically, increasing the progressivity of the tax
system to either discourage the increase in CEO wages or encourage after-the-fact
223
taxing away of the effective disparity in income, has proven to be a failure.
B. Dodd-Frank
On July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
224
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) was signed into law.
While Dodd-Frank as a
whole “focuses primarily on the financial services industry,” some requirements
are applicable to executive compensation, including Say on Pay, Shareholder Vote
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on “Golden Parachutes,” Disclosure of Relationship of Pay to Performance,
Disclosure of CEO Compensation Pay Ratio, Independence of Compensation
225
Committee Members, and Independence of Compensation Committee Advisors.
Dodd-Frank also includes rules for financial institutions that “[e]xpand[] regulation
226
of compensation arrangements that may encourage inappropriate risk-taking.”
Dodd-Frank will not work to stop this because, for the most part, we
Americans tend not to invest directly in stocks; instead, we outsource this by
227
These institutions own about two-thirds
investing in mutual and pension funds.
228
of all stock.
Thus, when 98.5% of companies that put their executive pay plans
up for a vote by shareholders, they received a resounding “yes,” the Wall Street
229
Journal reports.
The 2011 proxy season introduced Say on Pay (SOP), Say on Frequency
230
For the currently available 2011
(SOF), and Say on Golden Parachutes (SOGP).
data for Say on Pay, Say on Frequency, and Say on Golden Parachutes, companies
231
have not had problems obtaining shareholder support.
Following the implementation of SOGP, golden parachutes have been met
with “overwhelming support” from shareholders, with every company that
232
reported results as of September 26, 2011, receiving majority support.
However, support for the bonuses and compensation packages for executives in the
233
related mergers is lower than approval for the overall deals themselves.
But,
shareholders are not withholding support for golden parachutes in lieu of any
claimed exorbitant compensation—they are “likely to support the [golden
234
parachutes] when they believe the overall transaction makes sense.”
C. Reforms that Seek to Balance Tensions Between a Firm’s Stakeholders
Matsumura and Shin discuss some of the more widely discussed and

225
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proposed principles and reforms for CEO compensation that seek to better balance
235
the tensions that exist between each of a firm’s stakeholders.
For each of five
different proposals for reform they identify the intended and unintended
consequences.
The first reform discussed by Matsumura and Shin is to require greater
236
independence of compensation committees.
The theory is that a truly
independent compensation committee has the potential to play a significant role in
237
limiting excessive CEO compensation practices.
For instance, the New York
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) has rules that require firms to have compensation
238
committees that are entirely composed of outside independent directors.
Furthermore, the NYSE has a rule that the CEO cannot be a member of the
nominating committee for directors, so that it is more likely that appointed
239
directors will be truly independent and not beholden to the CEO.
All of these
rules appear theoretically sound when it comes to establishing appropriate CEO
compensation that is not excessive. Unfortunately, multiple studies find no
evidence that having affiliated versus independent directors leads to greater levels
240
of CEO compensation.
Another principle examined by Matsumura and Shin is to require executives
241
The theory is to more
to hold significant equity positions in the corporation.
242
directly align executive’s interest in the firm with shareholders’ interests.
243
However, there is a mounting body of research that challenges this theory.
One
problem is that there is a “discrepancy between the economic value of [stock]
244
options and the value of [stock] options to executives. . . .”
Plus, self-serving
executives can time the release of news and the timing of certain other matters in
245
ways that maximize their personal holdings of stock options.
In fact, there is
evidence that CEOs with large holdings of stock options will be tempted to use
246
artificial means, such as accounting practices, to maximize their wealth.
Matsumura and Shin also examined whether enhanced transparency through
requiring ever greater disclosure of executive compensation will limit excessive
247
CEO compensation practices.
In examining the research available they find it
difficult to conclude whether firms enjoy any net benefit from increased disclosure
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248

requirements.
In fact, a firm may experience a negative impact through
increased costs, as public disclosure may ratchet up CEO pay as firms participate
in a “beauty contest” “as firms seek to ensure that their executives are among the
249
higher paid.”
Matsumura and Shin examined the impact of increased institutional investor
involvement in corporate governance, including monitoring CEO pay versus
250
They note that the literature available provides only mixed
performance.
findings on the role that institutional investor involvement plays in restraining
251
CEO compensation.
Also, it is unclear whether institutional investors such as
mutual fund advisors have much incentive to monitor and become involved in
individual firms’ governance, since they can simply err on the side of liquidity if
252
trading costs are low enough for firms they believe have bad governance.
The last reform that Matsumura and Shin examined is to require firms to
253
Some believe that doing this
expense stock options in their income statements.
254
will lead to better compensation practices.
However, an equal argument can be
made that adding these expenses to the income statement will simply harm
employees, since firms will now have a strong economic incentive to stop granting
255
stock options to employees.
D. Dynamic Compensation Model
Maybe a fundamental rethink is in order. For instance, it has been proposed
to solve the potential problem of CEO excessive and unmerited pay by introducing
a dynamic compensation model, implemented using a mechanism called a
256
“Dynamic Incentive Account.”
This new model is designed to address problems
such as short-term orientation, premature payouts, and inappropriate stock
257
incentives after stock price declines.
Many models of CEO compensation
258
consider only a single period or single pay out.
However, it is noted that such a
static compensation contract may be found ineffective, given what is actually an
259
ever changing and dynamic world.
Incentives may lose their power over time,
and “if firm value declines, options may fall out of the money and bear little
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sensitivity to the stock price.”
Also, single-period contracts can encourage the
CEO to engage in behavior that benefits him immediately in the current period that
his compensation is tied to, such as inflating the current stock price and selling off
261
without regard for the longevity and health of the organization.
Conversely, a
dynamic model in the form proposed, where the CEO’s expected incentive pay is
placed into a “Dynamic Incentive Account,” provides opportunities for a firm to
implement metrics that truly tie compensation to stock performance and firm value
262
over the long run.
The account, comprised of both cash and the firm’s equity,
263
would serve to escrow a CEO’s expected pay.
It would also incorporate the
capability to rebalance the equity proportion to assure appropriate incentive, along
264
with “time-dependent vesting” to deter “short-termism”.
This focus on
rewarding effort with future rather than current pay can require the CEO to remain
265
sensitive to a firm’s future performance, even beyond their own retirement.

IX. CONCLUSION
The increase in the United States of the CEO versus employee pay gap is of
legitimate concern and has been for some time. This growing gap is especially
266
astonishing when compared to CEO pay levels in other countries.
While part of
the disparity between the pay of U.S. and foreign CEOs can be justified by
differences in social and business environments, including systems that are debtbased rather than equity-based, the gap is so large by any standard it must be
considered excessive. Excessive CEO pay can be, and is, harmful to both business
267
and society.
The potential harm to U.S. businesses includes suboptimal returns
to stakeholders because of compensation practices that emphasize short-term over
long-term management decisions and also tend to unnecessarily transfer capital
268
and returns away from the company, its employees, and shareholders.
The
potential harm to society includes the very real danger that excessive executive pay
and the bad corporate behavior and the poor results it causes will play a disruptive
269
role in the American political and economic system.
The recent near-collapse of
the banking and financial systems, and the migration of whole segments of
American industry overseas are evidence of this.
Thus, there is a very real need to curb any tendency of excess in CEO
compensation. Unfortunately, past U.S. government actions related to excessive
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CEO compensation practices and reporting can be deemed a failure as they have
270
actually had the perverse effect of introducing and amplifying the problem.
271
However, this does not mean nothing can be done about the problem.
Company
policies emphasizing and rewarding long-term management decisions would be a
start. As discussed in this paper, the deadly combination of an incentive system
that excessively relies on stock options within a short-term reward structure and an
imbalance of power between the CEO and the board of directors, both highlight
much of the root cause of the excessive CEO compensation problem and where to
look to fix it.

270
271

See discussion supra Part VII.
See discussion supra Part VI, VIII.

